Nash equilibrium

Results: 1082



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61Mechanism Design By Creditability Raphael Eidenbenz Yvonne Anne Oswald* Stefan Schmid** Roger Wattenhofer * speaker

Mechanism Design By Creditability Raphael Eidenbenz Yvonne Anne Oswald* Stefan Schmid** Roger Wattenhofer * speaker

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Source URL: disco.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2014-09-26 08:36:25
62Static Games of Incomplete Information  Page 1 Static Games of Incomplete Information

Static Games of Incomplete Information Page 1 Static Games of Incomplete Information

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:25
63Course:  Game Theory Faculty:

Course: Game Theory Faculty:

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Source URL: idea.uab.es

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-22 06:27:54
64Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games  Page 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in ExtensiveForm Games Ù

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games Page 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in ExtensiveForm Games Ù

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:28
65Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5 (September, 2004), 1583–1599  THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION BY FRANK HEINEMANN, ROSEMARIE NAGEL, AND PE

Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5 (September, 2004), 1583–1599 THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION BY FRANK HEINEMANN, ROSEMARIE NAGEL, AND PE

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:20:57
66Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanisms

Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanisms

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-10-30 16:18:44
67Journal of International Economics–450 www.elsevier.com / locate / econbase Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency Frank Heinemann*, Gerhard Illing Ludwig–Maximilians–Univ. Munchen,

Journal of International Economics–450 www.elsevier.com / locate / econbase Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency Frank Heinemann*, Gerhard Illing Ludwig–Maximilians–Univ. Munchen,

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:20:47
68REVIEW ‘‘ impose sanctions on others for norm violations. Strong reciprocators bear the cost of rewarding or punishing even if they gain no individual

REVIEW ‘‘ impose sanctions on others for norm violations. Strong reciprocators bear the cost of rewarding or punishing even if they gain no individual

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2006-02-06 17:08:07
69

PDF Document

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
70GAMES OF FIXED RANK: A HIERARCHY OF BIMATRIX GAMES RAVI KANNAN AND THORSTEN THEOBALD Abstract. We propose and investigate a hierarchy of bimatrix games (A, B), whose (entry-wise) sum of the pay-off matrices of the two pl

GAMES OF FIXED RANK: A HIERARCHY OF BIMATRIX GAMES RAVI KANNAN AND THORSTEN THEOBALD Abstract. We propose and investigate a hierarchy of bimatrix games (A, B), whose (entry-wise) sum of the pay-off matrices of the two pl

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Source URL: www.math.uni-frankfurt.de

Language: English - Date: 2009-10-26 07:32:48